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An extensive literature argues that India’s manufacturing sector has underperformed, and that the 
country has failed to industrialize; in particular, it has failed to take advantage of its labor-
abundant comparative advantage. India’s manufacturing sector is smaller as a share of GDP than 
that of East Asian countries, even after controlling for GDP per capita. Hence, its contribution to 
overall GDP growth is modest. Without greater participation of the secondary sector, the 
argument goes, the country will not be able to develop and become a modern economy. Standard 
arguments blame the “license-permit raj,” the small-scale industrial policy, and the supposedly 
stringent laws. All these were part of the industrial policy regime instituted after independence, 
which favored the heavy-machinery subsector. We show that this policy bias negatively affected 
the development of India’s labor-intensive sector, as the country should export with comparative 
advantage a larger number of these products, given its income per capita. However, India’s 
manufacturing sector is relatively well diversified and sophisticated, given also the country’s 
income per capita. In particular, India’s inroads into machinery, metals, chemicals, and other 
capital- and skilled labor–intensive products has allowed the country to accumulate a large 
number of capabilities. This positions India well to expand its exports of other sophisticated 
products. 
 
Keywords: Capabilities; Diversification; India; Industrial Policy; Revealed Comparative 
Advantage; Sophistication 
 




 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Two stylized facts in the development literature are, first, that the share of the manufacturing 
sector in overall output increases with income per capita before it starts declining, i.e., an 
inverted U-shape relationship (Felipe and Estrada 2008); and second, that manufacturing is a key 
driver of growth (Kaldor 1967; Rodrik 2006). Indeed, the importance of industrialization, and in 
general structural transformation, as the key to develop was highlighted by Kaldor (1967). In the 
Kaldorian framework, the manufacturing sector is subject to increasing returns to scale and is the 
engine of growth.
1 From a Kaldorian perspective, the manufacturing sector assumes a central 
role in the growth process thanks to its ability to generate spillovers, technical progress, 
economies of scale, induced productivity growth in the sector, and to raise the overall 
productivity of the economy. 
In India—despite the early emphasis on industrialization after independence and 
deregulation of the manufacturing sector as a key element of the reforms implemented since the 
mid-1980s—large-scale industrialization, as seen in East Asia, has not happened. Indeed, one of 
the salient features of India’s economic structure is the relatively low share of the manufacturing 
sector in GDP, about 15%, and it has not changed much over the last 30 years. This is 
significantly smaller than in the East Asian countries, and much smaller than in China, where the 
share of the manufacturing in GDP is about 35%. Using a logistic regression and controlling for 
income per capita and its square, population, and the share of trade in GDP ratio, Felipe and 
Estrada (2008) estimated that India’s manufacturing is about five percentage points smaller than 
it should be. Several reasons have been discussed in the literature for the underperformance and 
the relatively small size of the manufacturing sector in India. These include the industrial policy 
framework adopted in the early days of planning, along with the industrial and import licensing 
regime, the small-scale sector reservation policy, the rigid labor laws, and the lack of physical 
and social infrastructure. 
                                                 
1 Kaldor argued that manufacturing is the engine of growth, in the sense that the faster the rate of growth of 
manufacturing output, the faster the rate of growth of overall output (GDP). This is because manufacturing has 
strong linkages with rest of the economy, has potential for capital accumulation, and its potential for technical 
progress is highest. Felipe et al. (2009) estimate the responsiveness of the rest of the economy’s growth rate to 
growth in the individual sectors of the economy. Their estimates show that, in developing Asia, both industry and 
services have acted as engines of growth, and that services has had a larger impact than manufacturing. The reason 
is that many of today’s services are also subject to increasing returns to scale.  
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The relatively high growth achieved by India recently has come largely from the service 
sector, which has emerged as the main driver of growth, and has contributed an increasing share 
of the country’s overall growth rate: services contributed 50% of overall growth during 1980–
1990, 61% during 1990–2000, and 64% during 2000–2007.
2 The information technology (IT) 
sector has become a leading sector in India during the last decade. The IT sector was outside the 
ambit of the licensing system and did not suffer from regulation and control of its activities to the 
extent that the manufacturing sector did.  
Kochhar et al. (2006) argue that on the eve of the reforms, India’s policy stance with 
respect to the manufacturing sector was biased in favor of the skilled labor–intensive or large-
scale activities, and that the manufacturing sector was more diversified than would be expected 
given India’s income level. Under the development strategy adopted after independence, the 
public sector was assigned the role to lead India’s industrial development, with an emphasis on 
the heavy machinery sector. Given India’s large population, its comparative advantage lies in the 
labor-intensive activities. These activities, however, were used to employ millions of workers by 
reserving the manufacture of a large number of products exclusively for the small-sized units, 
with little regard for optimal size and economies of scale. Kochhar et al. (2006) found that this 
pattern persists even after twenty years, during which significant reforms were introduced. This, 
they argue, was the result of a policy regime that has protected small-scale industries, made it 
hard to lay-off workers in firms above a certain size, restricted imports if something could be 
produced domestically irrespective of cost, and promoted higher education and scientific 
learning. 
Viewing development as a path-dependent process that involves structural transformation 
and the accumulation of capabilities, this paper contributes to the debate on the effects of 
industrial policy in India. To this purpose, we examine the composition of exports at a highly 
disaggregated level and focus on two different aspects of the export basket, namely, its 
sophistication and its diversification. The sophistication level of the export basket of a country 
                                                 
2 Dasgupta and Singh (2005) have argued that the services sector in India, especially the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector, have the potential to play the same role, in a Kaldorian sense, as the 
manufacturing sector. Eichengreen and Gupta (2010) argue that sustained economic growth will require shifting 
labor from agriculture into both manufacturing and services sector and not just one or the other. On the other hand, 
Nagaraj (2006) argues that services cannot become an engine of growth as far as India goes because it lacks the 
potential to create jobs needed to absorb the vast labor pool from rural India. This role, he argues, has traditionally 
been performed by the industrial sector. Panagariya (2008: 287) argues that “India must walk on two legs,” 
manufacturing and services.  
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captures its ability to export products produced and exported by the rich countries to the extent 
that, in general, the exports of rich countries embody higher productivity, wages, and income per 
capita. Diversification, on the other hand, captures the ability to become competitive in a wider 
range of products and is measured by the number of products exported with revealed 
comparative advantage. Hidalgo et al. (2007) argue that development must be understood as a 
process of accumulating more complex capabilities and of finding paths that create incentives for 
those capabilities to be accumulated and used. A sustainable growth trajectory must, therefore, 
involve the introduction of new goods and not merely involve continual learning on the same of 
set goods.  
Using highly disaggregated SITC 4-digit data for 1962–2007 covering almost 800 
product categories, we find that India was a positive outlier on both sophistication and 
diversification, i.e., India’s export basket was more sophisticated and diversified than would be 
expected for a country at its stage of development. Further, we find that the diversification and 
sophistication of “core” products (metals, machinery, and chemicals) was above what one would 
expect given India’s per capita income. We also find that the share of core products in total 
manufacturing products exported with revealed comparative is relatively high. In other words, a 
labor-abundant country like India, whose comparative advantage lies in labor-intensive activities, 
has diversified in the skill-intensive and capital-intensive sector. There is nothing wrong with 
this strategy, and in fact we argue that some kind of “targeting” is necessary. Without it, it would 
have been impossible for a country like India to start manufacturing relatively sophisticated 
products. We argue that the stock of capabilities that India had accumulated on the eve of the 
reforms of the 1990s was the legacy of the industrial policies, which emphasized heavy industry–
led industrialization. However, we emphasize that not all aspects of industrial policy were 
beneficial, and that mistakes were made that resulted in inefficiencies and resource 
misallocation. Finally, we find that the number of labor-intensive products exported with 
revealed comparative advantage as a share of total manufacturing products exported with 
revealed comparative advantage is below what would be expected for a country at India’s level 
of development. Here lies India’s failure, especially when compared to China. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss India’s industrial 
policy landscape. Section 3 examines the evolution over time of the sophistication of India’s 
export basket and its diversification. We discuss the performance of the labor-intensive sectors,  
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analyze India’s progression into sophisticated products, and compare it with China. Section 4 
summarizes the arguments. 
 
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF INDIA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY LANDSCAPE AND 
MAJOR REFORMS 
 
The key objective of India’s new leadership after independence was to be self-sufficient in all 
sectors of the economy. The early days of policymaking were heavily influenced by the Nehru-
Gandhi ideology, which leaned towards a socialist framework by contemporary academic 
thinking (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Scitovsky 1954). The development strategy aimed at 
achieving self-sufficiency, industrializing, improving living standards, reducing the 
concentration of economic power, and attaining balanced regional development and an equitable 
distribution of the gains from economic growth. The planned economy model adopted was 
largely inspired by the Soviet-style “command and control” system. A key difference was that 
while the means of the production in the Soviet Union were owned by the state, in the case of 
India a large share of the economy was privately owned. To plan the private economy, a system 
of controls and regulatory regimes was adopted.
 3 
The key legislation on industrial development included the Industrial Policy Resolution 
of 1948; the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; the First and the Second Five 
Year Plans; and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956.
4 The industrial policy resolutions of 
1948 and 1956, and the first and second five-year plans gave a central role to the public sector. 
The public sector was entrusted to lead the development and expansion of India’s heavy 
machinery sector (i.e., to “make machines that make machines”) and overall industrialization. An 
active role of the public sector in industrial development, it was hoped, would also foster the 
equitable distribution of income and wealth, balance regional development, prevent the 
concentration of wealth, create employment opportunities, and generate resources for further 
development. 
                                                 
3 Mohan and Aggarwal (1990) note that the origins of the control and the regulatory regime can be traced back to the 
measures that were put in place at the beginning of the World War II. 
4 There literature on India’s development strategy after independence is voluminous. For reasons of space, we 
discuss only important legislations and their key aspects. More detailed accounts can be found in Bhagwati and 
Desai (1970), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1993), Joshi and Little (1994 and 1996), and Panagariya (2008).  
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Private sector activity was allowed, though the sectors in which it could operate were 
restricted. The key piece of legislation was the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 
1951 (IDRA). The key aim of this act was to regulate and control private sector activity in 
conformity with the government’s priorities, as noted in the five-year plans, and to direct scarce 
resources to industries considered important. A variety of instruments were used. Important 
among them were the industrial licensing and import licensing. Industrial licensing applied to 
any industrial undertaking above a certain size in a set of specified industries. No additional 
capacity expansion in the existing industrial undertakings (or new undertakings) was allowed in 
these scheduled industries. The license specified the minimum and the maximum quantity that 
could be produced. The government could dictate the location and the scale of the plant.
5 The 
industrial licensing regime was tightened over time and its reach widened.
6  
To reduce dependence on foreign exchange and achieve self-reliance, import substitution 
was encouraged. Trade restrictions in the form of import licensing and tariffs were introduced. 
Importing anything that could be produced domestically was discouraged regardless of the cost, 
and exporters were allowed to import inputs under various schemes. Import licensing, together 
with the industrial licensing, came to be known as the license-pemit raj. This system, which led 
to inefficiencies, created a culture of rent-seeking, erected barriers to entry and exit, provided 
indiscriminate and indefinite protection, led to misallocation of resources, and limited domestic 
and foreign competition (Ahluwalia 1991; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1975; Joshi and Little 1994; 
Panagariya 2008). Distribution and price controls were used to ensure that priority sectors 
received inputs at “reasonable” prices and to keep inflation in check. To avoid concentration of 
economic power in the hands of a few large industrial houses, the Monopoly and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act (MRTP), 1969, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1973, 
were introduced. These laws and regulations imposed severe constraints on the expansion of 
large business houses and discouraged foreign collaboration and investment. 
Labor-intensive small-scale enterprises, cottage industries, and household enterprises 
were promoted by protecting them against foreign and domestic competition, and providing 
                                                 
5 Industrial undertaking was defined as any undertaking carrying out an activity pertaining to any of the industries in 
the First Schedule of the Act in one or more factories. “Factory” in IDRA (1951) was defined as any premises where 
manufacturing activity was being carried out with by 50 or more workers with power or by 100 or more workers and 
without power. (Source: http://labour.delhigovt.nic.in/act/details_acts/industrialdevelopment/index.html) 
6 Key policy enactments included the Industrial Licensing Policy of 1970, and two industrial policy notifications 
dated February 2nd and 19th, 1973.  
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supportive measures such as preferential access to credit and subsidized credit. A key element of 
this policy, the Small-Scale Industrial (SSI) Policy, was introduced in 1967, whereby the 
production of some products was reserved exclusively to the small-scale sector (defined in terms 
of cumulative amount of investment in plant and machinery). Once a product was classified to be 
produced by the small-scale sector, no further capacity expansion was permitted for medium- or 
large-scale units, though they were allowed to produce. All further expansion or capacity 
creation was reserved only for the small-scale sector and only those firms that had investment 
limits below the threshold could produce items reserved for the SSI.
 Mohan (2002) provides a 
comprehensive discussion and a critical evaluation of the small-scale industry policy in India. He 
concludes that these policies have been harmful for the growth of the Indian manufacturing 
sector. 
A third aspect that has received considerable attention in the literature is India’s 
supposedly stringent labor laws. Significant job protection was accorded to workers, especially 
to those employed in large firms. A 1976 amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 
(IDA) made it necessary for firms employing more than 300 workers to seek the permission of 
relevant state governments in order to retrench or lay off workers. The reach of this expanded 
when a further amendment in 1982 lowered the ceiling to firms with more than 100 workers.
7 
These labor laws, by preventing restructuring and reallocation of resources, have allowed the 
Indian firms to remain small (Kochhar et al. 2006; Krueger 2007; Panagariya 2008).
8 
Finally, Bardhan (2006) argues that policy alone is not what has held back the 
manufacturing sector, but also the lack of physical and social infrastructure.  
Most aspects of the license-permit raj were in place until the 1980s, when the first steps 
were taken to dismantle the licensing regime. Among other steps, these reforms included the 
                                                 
7 Though the IDA does not prohibit retrenchments, state governments have often been unwilling to grant permission 
to retrench (Datta-Chaudhari 1996). 
8 Roy (2004) finds that the impact of labor laws is statistically insignificant in a regression explaining the 
underperformance of the manufacturing sector. Using case studies of labor practices, Deshpande (2004) concludes 
that the labor market is not as inflexible. In fact, using World Bank’s investment climate survey data on Indian 
states, labor regulations do not show up as a significant concern for enterprises (Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar 2008). 
This, Kochhar et al. (2006) and Krueger (2007) argue, could be because the incumbent firms have adapted to these 
laws and it is hard to say what decisions those firms would have made in their absence, i.e., lack of an appropriate 
counterfactual. Moreover, these laws affect investment decisions of the new entrants, who may choose a more 
capital-intensive, skilled-labor line of production or technology. To better understand the role played by labor laws, 
recent studies use differences in rigidity of labor laws across states to show that industrial performance has been 
weaker in states with pro-worker labor laws (Besley and Burgess 2004) and that gains from delicensing in pro-
worker labor laws are lower (Aghion et al. 2006). Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2009) show that states with relatively 
inflexible labor laws experienced slower growth of labor-intensive industries and slower employment growth.  
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abolition of the licensing regime for select industries and the liberalization of the trade regime 
(via reductions in the number of products listed under banned/restricted category).
9  
The second, and by all accounts the major, wave of reforms came in 1991. The New 
Industrial Policy announced in July 1991 extended industrial deregulation, in both its coverage 
and depth, beyond what had been achieved in the 1980s. These measures included the abolition 
of industrial licensing for all but 18 industries and the elimination of public sector monopolies, 
together with the prohibition of private investment in these industries (industries restricted for 
the public sector were reduced to 8 from 17), as well as the relaxation of foreign direct 
investment rules. While there was an upper limit on the extent of foreign participation, this 
varied across industries and has increased over the period. Sweeping trade liberalization 
measures were introduced. These included the elimination of import licensing and the 
progressive reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers. The export-import policy (EXIM policy) of 
1992–1997 reaffirmed India’s commitment to the promotion of free trade. All import licensing 
lists were eliminated and a “negative” list was established.
10 Except for consumer goods, almost 
all capital and intermediate goods could be freely imported subject to tariffs. By April 2002, all 
the remaining quantitative restrictions had been removed. Reforms were undertaken in the 
banking and the financial sectors as well. Liberalization measures were taken in important 
services such as telecommunications. Dereservation of the small-scale sector began only in 1997 
and the total number of products reserved for the small-scale sector had been reduced from 821 
in 1998–1999 to 21 items in October 2008.
11 
 
3. SOPHISTICATION AND DIVERSIFICATION OF INDIA’S EXPORT BASKET 
 
In this section, we analyze how the sophistication and diversification of India’s export basket has 
evolved since the 1960s. We focus particularly on the labor-intensive categories (the negatively 
affected by the country’s history of industrial policy) and on the machinery groups (the objective 
of the architects of the country’s industrial policy). We use a highly disaggregated data set 
                                                 
9 For further details, see Panagariya (2008) 
10 The establishment of a “negative” list implied that all items, except those in the negative list, could be imported 
without any import licenses and were not subject to any quantitative restrictions. The negative list consists of three 
sections: prohibited list, canalized items, and restricted list. 
11 http://commerce.nic.in/pressrelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2325.    
 
8
covering almost 800 products. We analyze both the overall export basket as well as the core 
products.
 12 In doing this, we closely follow the product space literature.
 13 
  The sophistication of a country’s export basket (EXPY) is calculated as the weighted 
average of the level of sophistication of the products (PRODY) that it exports.
14 Diversification 
is measured by the absolute number of products that a country exports with revealed comparative 
                                                 
12 Core products include chemicals (SITC Rev2 categories 51-59), machinery (SITC Rev2 categories 71-79, 87, 88, 
95), and metal products (SITC Rev2 categories 67, 69). For now, note that the core products tend to be more skilled 
labor–intensive, as well as use relatively more capital than other manufacturing products; we provide more 
discussion on product categories later in the paper. 
13 The product space is an application of network theory introduced by Hidalgo et al. (2007). It is a representation of 
all products exported (at our level of disaggregation, almost 800 products). It shows that some products are close-by 
to others because they require similar capabilities, while some others are in a sparse area of the product space. In the 
first case, it easy to jump from one product into another one (and therefore exporting it with revealed comparative 
advantage), while in the second case it is difficult. The core of the product space (that is, the area with many 
products close by) is comprised of chemicals, machinery, and metal products (320 products, 41% of the total). The 
periphery consists of petroleum, raw materials, tropical agriculture, animal products, cereals, labor-intensive goods, 
and capital-intensive goods (excluding metal products). These categories are based on the Leamer (1984) 
classification. Following Hidalgo et al. (2007) the capital-intensive category as defined by Leamer (1984) is split 
into two: capital-intensive goods (excluding metal products) and metal products. Leamer (1984: 73) notes that the 
labor-intensive category uses unskilled labor; capital-intensive uses capital and unskilled labor; machinery uses 
skilled labor and moderate amounts of capital; and chemical uses skilled labor and very large amounts of capital. 
Note that since the capital-intensive category, as defined by Leamer (1984), is divided into two groups in this paper, 
we assume both capital-intensive (excluding metal products) and metal products use capital and unskilled labor. 























EXPY is measured in 2005 PPP$. PRODY provides a measure of the income content of a product and is therefore 
not an engineering notion. Hausmann, Huwang, and Rodrik (2007) calculate PRODY as a weighted average of the 



























where xvalci is the value of country c’s export of commodity i and GDPpcc is country c’s per capita GDP. PRODY is 
measured in 2005 PPP$.  
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advantage. Revealed comparative advantage is measured as the ratio of the export share of a 




To understand changes in the sophistication level of a country’s export basket in the course of 
development, we examine its evolution across countries and over time. We estimate a regression 
of the log of EXPY on the log of GDP per capita and its square. We also control for period 
dummies.
16 Figure 1 shows the fitted values (continuous line), the 95% confidence interval 
(dashed lines), and the actual values for a selected group of countries. The fitted values show the 
expected level of export sophistication given a country’s level of development (proxied by its 
GDP per capita). 
Figure 1 shows that India’s export sophistication in the early 1960s, though within the 
95% confidence interval, was higher than that of countries such as Thailand, Brazil, or Malaysia. 
However, post-1970s, the level of sophistication of India’s export basket was significantly above 
what would be expected for a country at a similar stage of development. To give an example, 
                                                 




















Country c is said to have revealed comparative advantage in commodity i if the above defined index, RCAci, is 
greater than 1. The index of revealed comparative advantage can be problematic, especially if used for comparison 
of different products. For example, a country very well endowed with a specific natural resource can have a RCA in 
the thousands. However, the highest RCA in automobiles is about 3.6. 
16 Specifically, the relationship estimated is the following: 
jt jt t jt EXPY GDPpc dummy 1986-2007) 01 ln( ) ln( ) ( α αδ ε =+ + + 
where j is country and t is year from 1962 to 2007, and dummy for 1986–2007 takes value 1 if for the years 1986–
2007 and 0 otherwise; 1962–1985 is the omitted category. Country-specific characteristics are controlled using 
dummy variables. The estimation sample is limited to the countries previously noted. The estimation sample is 
limited to countries with at least 36 years of data and with a population of at least two million; oil exporters 
(Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Venezuela) are excluded. Liberia is also excluded from the sample as its GDP falls over time. All the terms 
included are statistically significant. Cubic and quadratic terms of ln(GDPpc) and their respective interactions with 
the period dummy variables were statistically insignificant. ln(GDPpc) and its interactions with the period dummy 
variables are jointly statistically significant. Also, ((ln(GDPpc))
2 and its interactions with the period dummy 




India’s average export sophistication ($12,005) for the period 2001–2007 is not significantly 
different from that of Brazil ($12,836) or that of Turkey ($12,549). The latter two, however, have 
much higher per capita incomes. To stress the significance of this point, note that the per capita 
income of today’s rich countries when they had similar levels of export sophistication as India in 
2007 was much higher. For example, Korea’s EXPY in the year 1985 was comparable to that of 
India today, but at three times the per capita income (Korea’s per capita income in 1985 was 
$7,500 and India’s per capita income in 2007 was $2,600). 
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Source: Authors’ estimation 
 
Another way of examining the sophistication of India’s export basket is to look at the 
sophistication of the core commodities only. We call this EXPY-core. This is calculated as 
overall EXPY, except that the set of commodities over which sophistication is measured is 
restricted to the core of the product space: machinery, chemicals, and metals. The core 
commodities are more sophisticated, as measured by PRODY, than those outside the core. The 
average PRODY of core commodities is $18,687, and that of outside the core is $11,634 (these 
are averaged from the PRODYs of 779 4-digit SITC products).
17 
To examine the sophistication level of India’s core exports given its income per capita, 
we estimate a regression of log of EXPY-core on the log of GDP per capita.
 18 Figure 2 shows 
                                                 
17 The average sophistication of the various Leamer (1984) categories are: petroleum, $15,446; raw materials, 
$10,934; forest products, $14,971; tropical agriculture, $8,441; animal products, $12,390; cereals, $8,794; labor-
intensive, $13,170; capital-intensive (excluding metal products), $12,459; metal products, $14,964; machinery, 
$19,205; and chemicals, $19,517. 
18 Specifically, the relationship estimated is the following: 
 
jtj t j t EXPY core GDPpc 01 ln( ) ln( ) α αε −= + +   
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the fitted values (continuous line), 95% confidence interval (dashed lines), and the actual values. 
The figure shows that India’s core exports have, for the most part, been either as sophisticated or 
more sophisticated when compared with the core exports of comparator countries such as Brazil, 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand. India lies outside the 95% confidence 
interval, i.e. India’s core exports are more sophisticated than what would be expected given its 
level of development. Also from figure 2, we see that, in general, core exports of the high-
income countries are more sophisticated. The average sophistication level of India’s core exports 
($18,955) during 2001–2007 is similar to that of France ($19,300), Japan ($19,288), Spain 
($19,258), Hong Kong ($18,750), Australia ($18,665), and Korea ($18,308). The latter, however, 
have much higher income levels than India.  
 
B. Diversification 
A key insight from Hidalgo et al. (2007) is that the more diversified a country is, the greater its 
capabilities, which allows it to acquire revealed comparative advantage in other products. Table 
1 shows the number of products India exported with revealed comparative advantage according 
to the Leamer (1984) classification over the period 1962–2007. We see that in 1962, out of a 
total of 71 products that India exported with revealed comparative advantage, only four (i.e., less 
than 6% of the total) were in the core. Animal products, cereals, and capital-intensive products 
(excluding metals) added up to 44 products. By 1980, the number of products that India exported 
with revealed comparative advantage had more than doubled to 157.
19 Of the 157 products, 38 
were core commodities, roughly a quarter of the total. This indicates that, on the eve of the 
reforms, India had built in a significant stock of capabilities in the core commodities. 
Over the next 27 years, India acquired revealed comparative advantage in an additional 
97 products (in net terms). In 2007, out of 254 products exported with revealed comparative 
advantage, 84 were in the core (representing one-third of the total). Of the 97 additional products 
in which India had gained a revealed comparative advantage between 1980 and 2007, 46 were in 
                                                                                                                                                             
where, j is country and t is year from 1962 to 2007. The estimation sample used is the same as noted previously. 
Higher powers of ln(GDPpc) and their interactions with the dummy variables were found to be statistically 
insignificant and hence not included. Also, period dummy variables were found to be insignificant. Country-specific 
characteristics are controlled using dummy variables. 
19 These numbers are the net gain, since India also lost revealed comparative advantage in some products during the 
periods considered. The net gain is the difference between the number of (new) products in which India acquired 




the core (6 in metal products, 16 in machinery, and 24 in chemicals). The other category that 
registered a significant increase in the number of products exported with revealed comparative 
advantage was the capital-intensive products (excluding metals). The number of products 
exported with revealed comparative advantage in this category increased by 14 (again in net 
terms), an increase largely due to the textiles sector, which saw an increase of 12 products.  
We stress six points regarding diversification. The first concerns the product 
composition. Between 1962 and 1980, there was a net gain in the number of products exported 
with revealed comparative advantage in the labor-intensive categories, capital-intensive 
products, metal products, machinery, and chemicals, with labor-intensive accounting for a 
quarter of the increase. Between 1980 and 2007, it was the core sectors that accounted for half of 
the net gain in the number of products exported with revealed comparative advantage. As noted 
above, there was net gain in capital-intensive and raw materials as well. The labor-intensive 
sector did not see any major net gains in the post-reform period.  
 
Table 1: India’s Export Diversification According to Leamer Classification 
    1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Petroleum  1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Raw  materials  8  7  9 10  8 10 14 15 14 22 25 25 
Forest  products  0 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Tropical  agriculture  7  8 12 10 12 10 11 11 14 13 18 17 
Animal  products  13 11 13 11 15 14  8  9 13 13 14 14 
Cereals  13 14 12 13 19 20 23 25 19 24 27 28 
Labor-intensive  7  7 12 32 30 28 29 34 37 39 37 36 
Capital-intensive 
(exc. Metals) 
18 21 20 28 33 29 37 44 41 45 44 47 
Core Commodities              
Metal products  1  3 11 12 15 10 13 21 21 21 19 21 
Machinery  1  2  4  9 12 17 14 12 14 22 23 28 
Chemicals  2  3  6  9 11 11 27 28 37 30 34 35 
Total  71  79 102 136 157 152 178 202 214 232 244 254 
 
Second, we examine how diversification changes with income per capita. We estimate a 
regression of the log of diversification on the log of GDP per capita, its square, and it cube. 
Period dummies are also included.
 20 Fitted values and the 95% confidence intervals obtained 
                                                 




from the regression, along with the actual values, are shown in figure 3. We find that India is 
diversified in a greater number of products than comparator countries such as Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand. Further, given its stage of development, the number of products 
in which India has revealed comparative advantage is significantly higher than what would be 
expected (shown by the fitted values). 
Third, during the period 2001–2007, China and India exported 257 and 246 products with 
revealed comparative advantage, respectively.
 21 Except for Indonesia (which exported 213 
products with revealed comparative advantage) and Thailand (197 products), no other lower-
middle income had a revealed comparative advantage in so many products. Other countries that 
were as diversified were either upper-middle income or high-income countries. Korea had 
revealed comparative advantage in 154 products during the period 2001–2007. Brazil and 
Russia, both upper-middle income countries, exported 190 and 105 products with revealed 
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where, j is country and t is year from 1962 to 2007, and a dummy for 1986–2007 takes the value of 1 if for the years 
1986–2007 and 0 otherwise; 1962–1985 is the omitted category. Country-specific characteristics are controlled 
using dummy variables. Estimation sample is limited to the countries previously noted. All the terms included are 
statistically significant.  
21 The measure of diversification shown is the average number of products that a country exported with revealed 
comparative advantage during 2001–2007. It does not mean that a country had revealed comparative advantage in 
the same 257 products in each year during 2001–2007.  
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Fourth, in figure 4 we compare how diversification in the core evolves with per capita 
income. Like with overall diversification, we estimate a regression of the log of diversification in 
the core on the log of GDP per capita, its square, and its cube. Also included are the period 
dummies.
22 Figure 4 shows that not only did India export a larger number of core products with 
revealed comparative advantage than other comparator countries, but also was exporting a 
significantly higher number of products than would be expected for a country at its stage of 
development (as shown by the fitted values). During 2001–2007, on average, India exported 81 
core products with revealed comparative advantage, while China exported 89. Among the lower-
middle income countries that exported a large number of core commodities with revealed 
comparative advantage were Ukraine (73), Thailand (68), and Indonesia (45). Other countries 
that exported so many core products with revealed comparative advantage are either high-income 
countries or upper-middle income countries. For the high-income countries (those in the OECD) 
it is not uncommon to export over 100 core commodities with revealed comparative advantage. 
Indeed, the average number of core products exported with revealed comparative advantage in 
the core for the high-income OECD countries is 105.  
Fifth, it is important to make a comparison with China. Table 2 shows China’s export 
diversification over 1962–2007. Over this period, China increased the number of products 
exported with revealed comparative advantage from 105 to 265, and in the core increased from 
14 to 106. The highest number of commodities that China exports with revealed comparative 
advantage is in the labor-intensive category. In China, the majority (39 out of 60 in 2007) of the 
machinery products exported with revealed comparative advantage are office and data 
processing, telecommunications, electrical, and photographic equipment. On the other hand, in 
India, the largest share (16 out of 28 in 2007) of machinery products exported with revealed 
comparative advantage are the power generating, machinery specialized for particular industries, 
metalworking, and general industrial machinery. Another interesting feature of China’s 
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where, j is country and t is year from 1962 to 2007, and a dummy for 1986–2007 takes the value of 1 if for the years 
1986–2007 and 0 otherwise; 1962–1985 is the omitted category. Country-specific characteristics are controlled 
using dummy variables. The estimation sample is limited to the countries previously noted. All the terms included 
are statistically significant.   
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progression is that it lost revealed comparative advantage in categories such as tropical 
agriculture, animal products, and cereals, and gained revealed comparative advantage in labor-
intensive, capital-intensive, and core commodities. The speed at which China acquired revealed 




Table 2: China’s Export Diversification According to Leamer Classification 
  1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Petroleum  0 1 1 1 5 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 
Raw  materials  9  8  7 10 13 11 15 14 16 11 11 11 
Forest  products  3 6 5 4 5 3 4 7 6 7 7 7 
Tropical  agriculture  15 23 25 23 20 17 15 15 15 10 10  8 
Animal  products  18 24 22 28 27 22 21 19 15  9  9  8 
Cereals  13 20 24 21 21 31 27 14 16  9  8  8 
Labor-intensive  18 22 32 36 49 44 60 59 63 69 69 68 
Capital-intensive (exc. 
Metals) 
15 14 16 21 21 32 37 35 36 47 47 48 
Core Commodities              
Metal products  6  7 10  9 14 10 17 16 18 20 21 26 
Machinery  1  4  7  8  3 15 22 36 41 54 55 60 
Chemicals  7 11 11 14 22 21 21 22 16 15 17 20 
Total  105 140 160 175 200 209 241 238 244 252 256 265 
 
 
Finally, we also analyze how the absolute number of overall products and core products 
exported with revealed comparative advantage change with the level of income. As discussed 
earlier, core products embody, in general, more complex capabilities than other products. 
Therefore, it could be the case that two countries export a similar number of products with 
revealed comparative advantage, but one of them has revealed comparative advantage in a larger 
number of core products. Capabilities in these two countries are of a very different nature. In 
figure 5, we examine how the share of the core commodities exported with revealed comparative 
advantage (we call this share_core) changes with the level of income per capita. We estimate a 
regression of share_core on the log of GDP per capita and its square. Also included are the 
period dummies.
24 Figure 5 shows that the share_core in India was above what could be expected 
for a country at a similar level of income. 
                                                 
23 For an in-depth analysis of China, see Felipe et al. (2010). 
24 Specifically, the relationship estimated is the following:  
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C. India’s Comparative Advantage in Labor-Intensive Products 
It is important to examine how revealed comparative advantage of the labor-intensive sector (as 
defined in the Leamer [1984] classification) changes with income per capita. To this purpose, we 
estimate a regression of the log of the share of labor-intensive products exported with revealed 
comparative advantage in the total manufacturing products exported with revealed comparative 
advantage, on the log of income per capita, its square, and period dummies.
25 Figure 6 shows the 
estimated values and the 95% confidence interval. During both subperiods, the share of labor-
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where, j is country and t is year from 1962 to 2007, and a dummy for 1986–2007 takes the value of 1 if for the years 
1986–2007 and 0 otherwise; 1962–1985 is the omitted category. Country-specific characteristics are controlled 
using dummy variables. The estimation sample is limited to the countries previously noted. All the terms included 
are statistically significant.  
25 The manufacturing sector is defined to include labor-intensive, capital-intensive, machinery, and chemicals as 
defined in Leamer (1984); see appendix table 1. It is common in the literature to use SITC (Rev. 2) codes 5 to 8 
(except 68) as manufacturing products. In using the above definition of the manufacturing sector, we leave out two 
sectors, namely 63 and 64.  
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intensive products in total manufacturing products was below the fitted line. In the case of China, 
on the other hand, the share lies within the 95% confidence interval. 
We showed in figure 5 the share of the number of core products in total products 
exported with revealed comparative advantage. In figure 7, we show how the share of the 
number of core products in manufacturing products exported with revealed comparative 
advantage changes with income per capita. We find that for the first period, the share was within 
the 95% confidence interval, but for the second period it was above the fitted line and outside the 
confidence interval. In other words, the share of the number of core products in total number of 
products exported with revealed comparative advantage is more than what would be expected for 
a country at India’s level of development. 
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Next we examine how the ratio of the number of labor-intensive products to the number 
of capital-intensive products exported with RCA changes with per capita income. Here capital-
intensive products are defined to include the capital-intensive, machinery, and chemicals sector 
as defined by Leamer (1984), who argues that these three sectors use more capital (see appendix 
table 1 and table 2). Figure 8 shows the estimated relationship. We find that India was below the 
fitted line, though within the confidence interval for the most part. For the period 1986–2007, 
India was below the fitted line, i.e., the ratio of the number of labor-intensive products to the 
number of capital-intensive products exported with comparative advantage was less than what 
would be expected. This could be happening due to an unusually smaller number of labor-
intensive products exported with revealed comparative advantage or an unusually high number 
of capital-intensive products that are exported with comparative advantage. From figures 6 and 
7, we see that it is both. This ratio in China, on the other hand, though below the fitted line for 
the period 1986–2007 is higher than in India.  
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  In figure 9, we look at the ratio of the number of unskilled labor–intensive products to the 
number of skilled labor–intensive products exported with revealed comparative advantage. 
According to the Leamer classification (see appendix table 1 and table 2), labor-intensive and 
capital-intensive (including metals which are in the core of the product space as defined by 
Hidalgo et al. [2007]) products use relatively more unskilled labor, and chemicals and machinery 
use relatively more skilled labor. Thus, the only difference between figures 8 and 9 is how 
capital-intensive sectors are categorized: in figure 8 it was in the sectors that use more capital 
and in figure 9 it is in the sectors that use more unskilled labor. We find that India is below the 
fitted line in both the periods, in the latter period it is outside the confidence interval.  
 
Figure 8: Ratio of Labor-Intensive Products to RCA in Capital-Intensive Manufacturing 
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Figure 9: Ratio of RCA in Unskilled Labor–Intensive Manufacturing Products to RCA in 
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Finally, figure 10 shows the two opposite ends of factor intensity, i.e., labor-intensive 
products on one hand, and machinery and chemicals on the other. Labor-intensive products use 
relatively more of unskilled labor and little of capital, whereas machinery and chemicals use 
relatively more skilled labor and capital. We find that the ratio of the number of labor-intensive 
products to the number of machinery and chemical products exported with revealed comparative 
advantage in India is below the fitted line in the first period, though inside the confidence 
interval. For the second period, India is below the fitted line and outside the confidence interval, 
showing that the ratio is significantly different from the expected value. The ratio in India is 







Figure 10: Ratio of RCA in Unskilled Labor–Intensive Manufacturing Products to RCA in 
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Our findings are consistent with those of Kochhar et al. (2006) who, using cross-country 
data for manufacturing output for 1981, found that India’s manufacturing sector was biased 
towards large-scale (capital-intensive) or skilled labor–intensive sectors.
26 They also found that 
the Indian manufacturing sector was more diversified than would be expected given India’s level 
of development. This pattern has persisted even after twenty years of significant reforms. 
Panagariya (2004) argues that reforms have been unable to provide an impetus to the labor-
                                                 
26 To be precise, Kochhar et al. (2006) find a bias towards large-scale sectors. They note that the measure of scale 
used in their paper could also be a proxy for capital intensity. The definition of skilled labor–intensive and large 
sectors used in Kochhar et al. (2006) is different from the one used here. Kochhar et al. (2006) measure labor 
intensity by the share of wages in value-added for the industry in a country (averaged across a broad group of 
developing countries). Relative size is the ratio of value-added per establishment within the industry over the value-
added per establishment within the country, averaged across countries for each industry. Skill is measured by the 
ratio of remuneration of highly skilled and skilled labor over the total value-added of the industry. Categorization of 
manufacturing sectors according to factor-intensity as used in this paper is shown in appendix table 2.   
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intensive manufacturing industries in India and exports of labor-intensive industries have not 
grown rapidly. This is where India lags behind China. 
The Nehru-Mahalanobis blueprint for India’s development recognized very early on the 
critical importance of the heavy machinery sector. The data show clearly that the capital- or 
skilled labor–intensive industries have seen fast export growth. Mistakes were made in the 
implementation of this vision, but it did help India get a foothold into the “core” of the product 
space. As shown in table 1, of the 157 commodities exported with revealed comparative 
advantage in 1980, 38 (a quarter of the total) were in the core of the product space. This means 
that by 1980 India had accumulated capabilities to produce and export a significant number of 
sophisticated products. Between 1980 and 2007, the period during which the industrial licensing 
regime was dismantled and import barriers were brought down (tariff rates are still among the 
highest in the world), the number of commodities with revealed comparative advantage 
increased to 254, a net gain of 97 commodities. Of these 97, 46 are in the core of the product 
space. In our view, this would not have happened in the absence of the “making machines that 
makes machines” philosophy, as shown by the fact that other countries at a similar level of 
development have a much smaller presence in the core of the product space. By making heavy 
machinery a focal point of the industrial development strategy, India was able to establish a 
presence in core commodities and build up capabilities in producing and exporting sophisticated 
products. Our argument is not that all the policies implemented pre-1980s were successful, or 
that the right tools were used to promote the heavy machinery sector. By focusing on heavy 
machinery, Indian policymakers defied comparative advantage, which lay with the labor-
intensive industries, but this provided a foundation and a base that the private sector has 
capitalized on later in a more supportive environment. 
The stock of capabilities and technologies that were built as a part of heavy machinery–
led industrialization provided India with a foothold in the core of the product space and the 
building blocks to exploit other nearby products once the license-permit raj was gone. On the 
other hand, the labor-intensive sectors continued to be bound by labor laws and small-scale 
industrial policy (until the late 1990s when the first set of dereservation was introduced). The 
two together tilted the composition of the manufacturing sector towards the skill-intensive, 
capital-intensive sector and away from the unskilled labor–intensive sector.  
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Similarly, the finding that India was more diversified (as measured by the number of 
products exported with revealed comparative advantage) may have been the result of a bias 
towards producing anything that could be produced domestically in an import-substitution-based 
industrialization strategy. Though this may not have been the best use of the scarce resources at 
the time, it did help accumulate capabilities in a wide array of products. In other words, India 
gained revealed comparative advantage in a variety of products, which in turn led to the 
accumulation of a diverse set of capabilities, making it easier to acquire revealed comparative 
advantage in other products. 
Another related factor that assisted in establishing an industrial sector biased towards the 
skill-intensive activities was the creation of a scientific and a technical infrastructure, as well as 
the set up of institutes of higher education, especially in engineering and management. India 
spent more on tertiary education as a percent of GDP per capita than any other country at its 
stage of development, and far more than what it spent on primary education. Of course, this may 
not have been the best allocation, but it did not harm India’s long-term growth prospects. 
Institutions of higher education, research, and development, which were established in the post-
independence period, provided the much needed know-how and highly skilled low-cost labor for 
industrial development, especially the heavy machinery, metals, and the chemical sectors. The 
ready availability of scientific and technical base, low-cost skilled labor, and experienced 
professionals provided the much-needed human resources to support the setting up as well as the 





In this paper, we have examined the sophistication and diversification of India’s export basket 
since the 1960s. The industrial development strategy adopted after independence favored the 
heavy machinery and capital-intensive sectors at the expense of the labor-intensive activities. 
These were promoted by reserving some products exclusively to be produced by small units. The 
data show that: (i) on both accounts, overall sophistication and diversification of the export 
                                                 
27 The information technology (IT) sector has become a leading sector in India during the last decade. The rise of the 
IT sector is sometimes attributed to “benign neglect,” in the sense that it was outside the ambit of the licensing 
system and did not suffer from regulation and control of its activities in the same way as the manufacturing sector. 
Balakrishnan (2006) and Singh (2010) note that the IT sector was a beneficiary of a “newer” industrial policy 
framework that promoted and encouraged new activities, rather than regulated and controlled them.  
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package, India is a positive outlier after controlling for income per capita; (ii) India has 
succeeded in acquiring revealed comparative advantage in a significant number of sophisticated 
products, and now exports a large number of chemical, machinery, and metal products with 
revealed comparative advantage; and (iii) the number of labor-intensive products exported with 
revealed comparative advantage has increased during the last five decades, but probably not as 
much as it should have. Overall, India is exporting fewer labor-intensive products and a higher 
number of skilled labor–intensive products (and also the ones using relatively more capital) as a 
share of the total number of manufacturing products exported with revealed comparative 
advantage than is typical for a country at India’s level of per capita income. 
  Post-reforms, the skilled labor–intensive sectors and the sectors using relatively more 
capital benefited from the capabilities accumulated that were built as a part of heavy machinery-
led industrialization. In choosing this path, India seemed to be defying its comparative 
advantage, which lay with the labor-intensive sectors. Taking a path-dependent view of 
development, this strategy allowed India to accumulate capabilities in key areas. No doubt 
mistakes were made in targeting certain sectors. However, it would have been impossible for a 
country like India to acquire comparative advantage in sophisticated activities by simply 
following its comparative advantage. The labor-intensive sector, on the other hand, continued to 
be bound by rigid labor laws and small-scale industrial policy (until recently), which prevented 
firms from operating at the optimal size and from achieving economies of scale required in a 
world of wafer-thin profit margins. The significant number of reforms introduced since the 1980s 
have not led to the expansion of the labor-intensive sectors. Here lies India’s failure and the 
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Appendix Table 1: Leamer’s Classification and SITC Rev. 2 (2-digit) 
Leamer’s Classification  SITC  Leamer’s Classification  SITC 
1. Petroleum     7. Labor-intensive    
   Petroleum and petroleum products  33     Non-metallic mineral  66 
            Furniture  82 
2. Raw materials        Travel goods, handbags  83 
   Crude fertilizer and crude minerals  27     Articles of apparel  84 
   Metalliferous ores  28     Footwear  85 
   Coal  32     Miscellaneous manufacture  89 
   Gas  34     Postal packages, not classified  91 
   Electric current  35     Special transactions, not classified  93 
   Non-ferrous metals  68     Coin (other than gold coin)  96 
   Gold, non-monetary   97          
         8. Capital-intensive    
3. Forest products        Leather  61 
   Cork and wood  24     Rubber  62 
   Pulp and waste paper  25     Textile yarn, fabrics  65 
   Cork and wood  63     Sanitary fixtures and fittings, nes  81 
   Paper  64     Iron and steel  67 
            Manufactures of metals, nes  69 
4. Tropical Agriculture             
   Vegetables and fruit  05  9. Machinery    
   Sugar  06     Power generating  71 
   Coffee  07     Specialized for particular industries  72 
   Beverages  11     Metalworking  73 
   Crude rubber  23     General industrial  74 
            Office and data processing  75 
5. Animal products        Telecommunications  76 
   Live animals  00     Electrical  77 
   Meat  01     Road vehicles  78 
   Dairy products  02     Other transport equipment  79 
   Fish  03     Professional and scientific instruments  87 
   Hides, skins  21     Photographic equipment  88 
   Crude animal and vegetable materials  29     95 
   Animal and vegetable oils and fats  43    
Armoured vehicles, firearms, and ammunition 
  
   Animals, live (nes)  94          
         10. Chemicals    
6. Cereals        Organic  51 
   Cereals  04     Inorganic  52 
   Feeds  08     Dyeing and tanning  53 
   Miscellaneous edible products  09     Medicinal and pharmaceutical  54 
   Tobacco  12     Oils and perfume  55 
   Oil seeds  22     Fertilizers  56 
   Textile fibers  26     Explosives  57 
   Animal oils and fats  41     Artificial resins and plastic  58 
   Fixed vegetable oils and fats  42     Chemical materials, nes  59 
Source: Leamer (1984) and Hidalgo et al. (2007).  
Note: Italicized subsectors are in the core of the product space.  
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Appendix Table 2: Categorization of Manufacturing Sector Products by Factor Intensity 
Labor* Skilled  Labor* 
Sectors using relatively more labor and 
relatively less of capital 
Sectors using relatively more unskilled labor 
and relatively less of skilled labor 
Labor-intensive Labor-intensive 
 Capital-intensive  (excluding metal products) 
 Metal  products# 
Sectors using relatively more capital and 
relatively less of labor 
Sectors using relatively more skilled-labor 
and relatively less of unskilled-labor 
Capital-intensive (excluding metal products)  Machinery 
Metal products# Chemicals 
Machinery  
Chemicals  
Note: *Manufacturing sectors are based on the Leamer (1984) terminology shown in appendix table 1.  
#SITC codes 67 and 69, originally categorized under capital-intensive sectors but separated for the purposes 
of this paper. 